work, and I think if we show some progress and success, it would inspire other companies and other countries to try it as well."
Musk evidently also commented that suborbital flight is "little league," which I find a bit ironic when he's simultaneously touting the incremental approach to reusability. In my view that "little league" provides the least risky increments, the least requirement for capital at each increment, and the greatest flight experience path (because of lower costs with virtually guaranteed reusability at each increment) to practical, two stage, fully reusable orbital systems.
But Musk's emphasis on the importance of reusability is absolutely correct, and I wish SpaceX the best in their own pursuit of it.New Mexico New Space Notes:
New Mexico Politics and Richardson's Fast DC Departure - On Sunday, January 4th, Governor Bill Richardson of New Mexico withdrew from the confirmation process for Secretary of Commerce. The proximate stated cause was the grand jury investigations of connections between Richardson campaign donations and state contracts.
Given the governor's previous pledge to be a voice for commercial space in the new Administration, this turn of events was a disappointment to New Space circles. It's not clear how far the state investigations will taint him, even if he's found innocent. In any event, his voice will carry less force when 'calling in' from Santa Fe versus the weight it would have had - not to mention the immediate access to events and the leverage available - were he in the Cabinet.
Many speculate that his withdrawal from the Commerce post had more to do with the new Administration wanting to avoid an echo of the Illinois 'pay for play' scandals than with the merits of the New Mexico case. Some in that state have told me that they expect Richardson to be cleared, and have pointed to their own experience with existing "rigid procurement laws" there.
Yet reports in the New York Times and on a state political blog send contradictory impressions. On the one hand, Richardson has signed legislation barring contributions to public officials during contracting, and initiated a push for campaign finance limits; on the other, some vociferously complain that he's been at the heart of widespread political corruption in the state (<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/11/us/11newmexico.html?_r=4&pagewanted=1&hp>, and <http://haussamen.blogspot.com/>). Indeed, a guest columnist in the noted blog seemed to have recently painted Richardson's personality and behavior in terms that approach the satanic.
Ouch.
An outsized personality isn't exactly unusual for a politician, and I can't predict where the investigations will go - I just hope that the worst isn't true. Whether he's in Washington, Santa Fe, or elsewhere I merely hope that we will have a chance to hold the Governor to his promise regarding commercial space.
Both Agreements Signed Between New Mexico and Virgin Galactic - In accord with the prediction by state Spaceport Authority Director Landeene (see my concluding issue of 2008, Vol. 3, No. 24), the state signed a 20-year lease agreement for the establishment of operations by, and the world headquarters of, Virgin Galactic at "Spaceport America" (<http://www.spaceportamerica.com/news/press-releases/18-spaceport-press-articles/190-governor-bill-richardson-announces-spa-virgin-galactic-lease-agreement.html>).
Landeene told me later that the "development terms and conditions" agreement had also been signed, on December 29th. There was no press release on that, however.
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Dear Acquaintances,
- Building (or Not) Essential Institutional Relations -
Introduction
As fundamental to the New Space enterprise as plausible technical and business plans are honorable and clear-headed practices among companies, localities and state and federal agencies. Even with good intentions on all sides unanticipated factors can throw in a monkey-wrench; in contrast, other cases can raise less palatable questions.
Mojave Spaceport and the FAA/AST
In the last part of 2007, there was a sudden threat that the Mojave spaceport might have its license suspended or revoked if it didn't comply within 90 days with missile range safety standards for explosives. These have been used at "Old Space" 'commercial' launch facilities. But the immediate problem was averted, and within a few months a lot of us assumed that the longer term one had been as well.
The unintended consequences for commercial space of Richardson's departure from the nascent Obama Administration may take time to become evident. So, too, I was surprised the other day to discover that a resolution to the Mojave issue didn't finally come until the end of 2008.
As one observer close to the affair recounted, as much as New Space has been learning to deal with _necessary_ regulations, FAA/AST (the commercial space transportation office in FAA) has been learning to adapt to new circumstances. One of these is launch sites from which the vehicles to fly aren't merely variations on a basic 'missile' template. The regulations for spaceport licensing that'd been written by the Agency in 2000 had preserved the older assumptions.
Since Mojave was the first spaceport that clearly wasn't a missile range, and after some deliberation, AST agreed to accept certain New Space industry and airport explosives standards in approving the site license. Still, other standards lagged in adapting to the new conditions. For some three years after, there followed a dialogue in which the East Kern Airport District (EKAD, owner/operator of the Mojave Air & Space Port) pointed AST to National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards as a reasonable alternative. With communications among EKAD, NFPA and AST, the situation was moving towards adoption of the NFPA yardsticks to provide good safety compliance.
That process was disrupted by the fatal accident during the 2007 Scaled Composites' nitrous oxide flow test. What followed was an intense refocus on the issue, or as the observer put it, "...suddenly FAA got more help than they could use on the subject of safety at Mojave." Under such conditions it was understandable that the Agency tilted again towards Old Space traditions about commercial launch sites. Within that framework, rockets and rocket related operations are assumed so inherently hazardous that the public's safety must be guaranteed by keeping almost everyone from the sites.
An eventual consequence was the setting of the 90 day deadline for meeting such stringent requirements rather than continuing along the path of evolutionary discussion. Some pretty hair-raising days followed. Mojave was faced with a choice between meeting the older spaceport standards, which would have made it impossible to continue operating as an airport, or losing its spaceport license.
But a bit of time and some changing circumstances relieved the dilemma.
Some of this emerged from ongoing personnel shifts within AST unrelated to Mojave, allowing the matter to return to the earlier, more deliberate path. Individuals _do_ matter. As the observer noted, he and his colleagues had long been urging AST to bring in more people with hands-on experience in the issues, putting these engineers and operators in positions of authority. While the others in the Office were not intending a fatal disruption of past progress, they just weren't as well equipped to finding a path that would resolve the situation that had emerged.
Today, the observer notes that, "...the process is bearing fruit: seemingly intractable problems are yielding to common sense and engineering judgment." He credits AST head George Nield with structuring the resolution of the safety standards. An inspection at Mojave by AST personnel at the end of September, 2008 resulted in an immediate formal judgment that the spaceport had achieved satisfactory compliance with AST standards.
Not every last concern has been fully resolved, but in the long run the process worked to satisfy the needs of the parties, and is continuing along that path.
The five year Mojave license expires in June, and as the observer wryly noted "...we get to do it all over again." All involved hope that the 'lessons learned' in the meantime will be enduring.
Rocket Racing and the City of Las Cruces
On January 6th, the Las Cruces, NM, Sun-News headlined a story, "City won't bail out of deal with Rocket Racing," <http://www.lcsun-news.com/ci_11384004>. Back on June 16th of last year (Vol. 3, No. 14), I reported on land development plans by the Rocket Racing League (RRL) on leased city airport property. This was to begin with hangars for the racing teams. At the time I'd been told by a person involved with the development that two of the hangars were nearly complete.
Disturbing items emerged from the new Sun-News article, which centered on a January 5th meeting of the Las Cruces City Council, at which it was considered whether to declare the RRL in default on the lease.
One point was that even those first two hangars remain only 80% complete, though they were supposed to have been finished by January 15th. The major reason is apparently is a dispute between the RRL and the state's Construction Industries Division (CID). The RRL contended that firewalls were not needed; the CID, citing state standards, responded by halting construction and refused to issue occupancy certificates. Indications are that the RRL is determined not to give in on the firewall matter, and will lobby state officials until the standards are modified in their favor.
More significant, though lease payments were due for the total of six hanger parcels back on May 1st of last year, the RRL didn't pay the city until the last week of 2008. This included added late fees. (The nominal original requirement was for 10% over the base of $12,000 for each month or partial month overdue.) RRL CEO Grainger Whitelaw phoned into the City Council meeting and was said to have expressed contrition. He said, "I apologize for that...I will take responsibility for that. In our business, it was overlooked. I have no excuse."
But what was so difficult for the RRL about keeping track of $12,000 in _payments to their host city_? The best light in which one can see this incident is as an absence of commonsense diplomacy. Mayor Ken Miyagishima of Las Cruces was quoted as stating, "What concerns me is the way the city was treated ...We're talking about $12,000, and yes, it's a decent amount."
My thanks to Sun-News reporter Sam Ramirez for information on just how the city was treated. Noting that the Mayor's words expressed the sense pervading the council room, he cited the voluminous packet of background material prepared for the meeting and available on the newspaper's website (<http://www.lcsun-news.com/las_cruces-news/ci_11364673?source=email>). For the RRL matter, Resolution 09-160, start on page 323, item 8 in the "Discussion Items" section.
While not required to do so, the city had sent repeated invoices for the payments that had been due on May 1st - in September, October and November. These were accompanied by repeated phone calls to the RRL. It did not respond. Meanwhile, three other potential tenants had become interested in the land, which, per the Council's background material, "...are prime airport parcels as they have taxiway access, have been surveyed, and have City utilities already in place."
Meanwhile, the dispute between the RRL and the state building agency that resulted in a 'red tag' on the hangars had also made the contractor, Metal Building Specialists, apprehensive that the RRL would not pay the remaining money owed it. The company sought a lease with the City so it could finish the buildings (presumably) in compliance with the CID, and rent them out.
Despite the accumulated issues, at the January 5th meeting the City Council decided to extend the leases with the League - but only under strict conditions: first, the 2009 leases were required to be prepaid by 45 days after the Council meeting; second, all six hangars must be completed by September 30, 2009.
Doubts have been expressed over the years about the fundamental business viability of rocket racing. Deadlines have fallen by the wayside, but that's nothing foreign to New Space ventures learning how to do what they need to to become viable. And I have hoped for the RRL's success because (for example) it might be, "...an ongoing testing ground for fast-turnaround, reliable rocketry with New Space applications" (in the cited June issue of this "Report"
.
Even if that $12,000 was hardly noticeable pocket change over at the RRL, it seems a long stretch to believe that such a vital element for good relations with Las Cruces simply got "overlooked" so consistently for so many months. One is really tempted to ask whether the RRL had even that small amount available. Is Las Cruces incident a flag to more fundamental problems at the League? I have wanted to believe the better of them, but, dismayingly, this gives weight to several very negative items floating about.
Let's recall the suborbital vehicle "joint venture" between Armadillo and RRL, for which New Mexico is slated to appropriate $3 million for manufacturing, hangar and office space at another League real estate venture near Las Cruces airport. One might consider reviewing the following, stated in Vol. 3, No. 22 (November 20, 2008) of this Report, "... is specifically directed to be for Armadillo's work on the suborbital system." In any case, the RRL/Las Cruces situation seems to have developed into an unfortunate counterpoint to the one discussed in the previous section.
- "Won't Get Fooled Again": NASA Administrators and Policy Directions -
Getting to the Heart of the Matter
The recent chatter over who would be the next NASA administrator brought to mind that song by "The Who." (Actually, I'm such a nerd that I first saw it as the title of an episode of the late lamented series, "Farscape."
Stories that the NASA transition team is reexamining Griffin's Ares 1 vehicle and related issues elicited cautious hopes in the New Space community. I am acquainted with and have great admiration for several on the panel. But the selection of an Administrator and of fundamental Agency directions will ultimately depend upon Mr. Obama's senior transition staff and himself (See, e.g. "Choice on Continuing Ares Looms For New Administration" in "Space News" which appeared on a temporary link on January 9th and in the January 12th print edition.)
The most fundamental issue is whether the staff or the new President take space-related issues as so unimportant that they are decided almost by accident rather than intent. Too often that has happened in the past. That's understandable, given that the "Apollo Model" of spaceflight bequeathed us by the cold war locked it away at cost and risk levels preventing wide and deep relevance to our national economy, our well-being, and any involvement except vicariously via 'stage-star' astronauts.
I stated recommendations in Vol. 3, No. 22, under "NASA's Direction and New Space," but my baseline hopes are more modest. They are for the preservation of the COTS program and the ISS private supply contracting, and for the expansion of private competitive supply services to human spaceflight, with immediate funding of a COTS-D demonstration program for that. Congress expressed considerable support for such measures in the NASA Authorization bill (which carries no dollars) last year. But as a Hill staff director noted in the Space News item, "...if the money isn't there, then priorities need to be set."
The question is whether the people at the top of the transition for Mr. Obama - and whomever they and Congress approve as the next NASA Administrator - will really comprehend _or care about_ the options for stretching NASA dollars that New Space affords. Will their new NASA Administrator? A serious choice will, and will make the effort to understand the key contracting and programmatic reform options.
A priority for the new Administration and people like John Podesta (the overall Obama transition leader) is re-expanding Earth Science Research at NASA. Where will they get the money? They should escape the Old Space image of NASA far enough to recognize what I'll call a "win-win-win" solution. Private ISS supply services will save huge amounts vs. continuing to fly the Shuttle; COTS-D - created capability releases one from the rising cost of Soyuz services from Russia; and both (along with ditching the Ares 1) promise lower development prices as well as operating costs that can seed new private space industries, just as the US government's "ARPAnet" prepared the ground for the internet and the explosion of business innovation and prosperity that resulted.
Human space exploration can be affordable and sustainable in parallel to Earth Science and other priorities by turning away from the Ares and other components of Griffin's architecture to the use of EELVs, orbital assembly, and orbiting fuel depots.
Message to Mr. Podesta and his colleagues: It wouldn't take much to care beyond image or political reward _alone_ in selecting an Administrator. Many could rise to doing the needed job, but there are concerns inherent to many seemingly 'obvious,' candidates that result from the 'once over lightly' approach.
The concern if choosing an ex-astronaut is that the person was inevitably immersed for years in NASA's massively inefficient way of doing almost anything, and the agency should not just be about that 'star-astronaut' system that results. The concern about an engineer such as Mr. Griffin is that NASA is not just about engineering, particularly of the grossly expensive and limiting Old Space type. The concern about choosing a scientist is that NASA is not just about science, and many scientists have been had their vision blinkered by the methodologies necessary to the rigors of their disciplines.
The objectives at NASA can _include_ earth science, space science, exploration, stimulating new industries - _and_ sparking capabilities to open a frontier rather than a new circus show. Who can best tackle doing the required spectrum of jobs? Who will be intelligent enough, open-minded enough and secure enough in their ego to implement the changes needed to _actually get these goals accomplished_?
And will anyone in the deciding levels of the Obama transition care about _any_ of these questions?
Later: Supplement on a Selection and a Policy
As of this writing, the most frequently mentioned name for NASA Administrator is former Air Force Major General Scott Gration. That he apparently has minimal experience with space is in my view - as one may gather from the above comments - no necessary disqualifier. Not having Old Space baggage can be a big positive. To date, comments about him seem to lean upon shreds of information found here and there that could be interpreted to mean that he is likely an Old Spacer - nearly by default.
What concerns me more about Gration's possible selection are two stories out there:
-- One, that he really wanted to be head of Defense, so NASA would likely be in his eyes a poor substitute. That's not exactly a good portent for taking on the job with seriousness and dedication;
-- Two, that he was at some point thrown out of a Defense position by Secretary Gates for taking upon himself the status of some 90 individuals over which he had no jurisdiction.
As to "policy realism," the Obama Administration's massive economic stimulus proposal evidently includes $600 million for NASA. But as Jeff Foust noted on January 17th, the money goes to Earth Sciences, Aviation Safety, and repairs to NASA facilities, "...no money for accelerating Constellation, extending the shuttle, funding COTS crew capabilities, or anything else that might address the shuttle-Constellation gap." (<http://www.spacepolitics.com/2009/01/17/seeking-more-stimulus/>)
Frankly, and as implied in the previous section, I never expected any supplemental dollars for NASA from the new Administration at all, even for their Earth Science mission. That's not cynicism, it's realism about where practical spaceflight is in Washington's priorities. As I've said, spaceflight has stayed too expensive to become a sufficiently major part of the economy. But as I've also said, the problem is not that of NASA lacking money, it's that of being trapped in decades of destructively inefficient and ineffective cycles of how it's spent. That is the pattern that Mr. Griffin and the pork-masters of Washington politics would have us perpetuate..
Yours very truly,
Charles A. Lurio, Ph.D.
The Lurio Report
News and Analysis of the 'New Space' Enterprise
(www.thelurioreport.com)
Charles A. Lurio, Ph.D., Writer/Publisher
charleslurio@thelurioreport.com
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